Good Morning CIPAWorld! Coming to you live with another defense win featuring California’s anti-spam law.
On October 8, 2026, Judge Sherilyn Peace Garnett of the Central District of California granted Warby Parker’s motion to dismiss a putative class action brought by plaintiff Bianca Garcia, represented by Pacific Trial Attorneys (“PTA”). The Court concluded that Garcia’s claims under California Business and Professions Code Section 17529.5 were preempted by the federal CAN-SPAM Act. But the defense victory did not stop there: the Court also dismissed Garcia’s California Invasion of Privacy Act (“CIPA”) trap-and-trace and common law intrusion-upon-seclusion claims for lack of standing.
See Garcia v. Warby Parker Inc., No. 2:26-cv-02980-SPG-MBK, 2026 WL 3036405 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2026).
The Allegations: A Starting at $95 Offer and an Allegedly Deceptive Email
Garcia alleged that she received an unsolicited commercial email advertising prescription glasses “starting at $95.” According to the First Amended Complaint, the email contained a misleading domain name, falsified header information, and a deceptive subject line.
Specifically, Garcia alleged that the email originated from the domain “ipayt.com,” which she believed related to a pending payment. She further contended that the $95 advertisement was misleading because it failed to disclose additional costs associated with certain prescriptions and lens features.
Garcia also alleged that, after clicking the email’s embedded link, she was directed to Warby Parker’s website, where tracking pixels purportedly collected her personal information and shared it with third parties.
Based on these allegations, Garcia asserted claims under Section 17529.5, California Penal Code Section 638.51, and common law intrusion upon seclusion.
CAN-SPAM Preemption: Not Every Allegedly Misleading Email Is Actionable
The Court began its analysis with the federal CAN-SPAM Act, which broadly preempts state laws regulating commercial email advertisements, subject to a narrow exception for falsity or deception.
Relying on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., 575 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2009), the Court explained that state-law claims must involve materially false or deceptive representations to escape federal preemption.
Applying that framework, the Court rejected each of Garcia’s three theories of liability.
First, the domain name. Garcia alleged that the use of “ipayt.com” concealed Warby Parker’s identity and suggested that the email concerned a financial payment. But the Court found that the allegations, at most, demonstrated incomplete information about the sender—not a material misrepresentation. Garcia also failed to sufficiently allege that Warby Parker used the domain without permission.
Second, the header information. Although Garcia claimed the email contained falsified or forged header information, the email attached to her complaint identified its sender as a “WarbyParker Affiliate.” The Court concluded that this exhibit undermined her assertion that the sender’s identity had been misrepresented.
Third, the subject line. Garcia challenged the advertisement “Rx glasses starting at $95,” arguing that it omitted additional costs associated with certain lens features. The Court still was not convinced, finding that the absence of such information did not, without additional factual allegations, establish a material misrepresentation.
Ultimately, the Court held that Garcia’s Section 17529.5 claim was preempted by the CAN-SPAM Act.
Then, The CIPA Claims Fell Short
The Court separately addressed Garcia’s allegations that tracking pixels deployed on Warby Parker’s website violated California’s trap-and-trace statute and constituted intrusion upon seclusion.
Once again, Popa has been quite popular. Relying on the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Popa v. Microsoft Corp., 153 F.4th 784 (9th Cir. 2025), the Court emphasized that a plaintiff asserting a privacy claim in federal court must allege a concrete injury sufficient to establish Article III standing.
Although Garcia alleged that tracking pixels intercepted communications and allowed third parties to compile and sell personal information, she failed to identify the specific communications intercepted or the supposedly sensitive information collected.
The Court distinguished these allegations from the extensive collection of personalized browsing information alleged in In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litigation, 956 F.3d 589 (9th Cir. 2020).
Without sufficient allegations identifying the actual privacy intrusion, Garcia failed to establish standing for either her trap-and-trace or intrusion-upon-seclusion claim.
So, What?
Garcia provides another useful decision for businesses defending California anti-spam and website-tracking lawsuits.
On the anti-spam front, the decision reinforces that allegations of misleading domain names, header information, or subject lines do not automatically escape CAN-SPAM preemption. Plaintiffs must plausibly allege material falsity or deception—not merely incomplete information or advertising language they consider misleading.
And on the CIPA front, the ruling underscores the importance of identifying a concrete privacy injury. Generalized allegations concerning tracking pixels, data brokers, and allegations of information sharing may not suffice to establish standing in federal court.
However, more may be to come with the Court granting Garcia 21 days to amend her complaint to address the identified deficiencies and denying Warby Parker’s request to strike the class allegations.
Still, the message from Garcia is clear: Allegations of deceptive emails and invasive tracking must be supported by facts—not simply labels.
Stay tuned as we continue monitoring developments!