Hi, CIPAWorld! Kelly Sandberg here, with a new ruling providing perspective on how the Western District of Washington has analyzed California Invasion of Privacy Claims.
In T.S. v. Body Contour Centers, Plaintiff T.S. brought action against Defendant Body Contour Centers d/b/a Sono Bello (“Sono Bello”) for violations of the California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (“CMIA”), the California Invasion of Privacy Act (“CIPA”), and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”) for its placement of the Facebook Tracking Pixel – Meta – on its website. T.S., v. Body Contour Centers, LLC d/b/a Sono Bello, No. 2:24-CV-01944-LK, 2026 WL 2921971 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 29, 2026).
Sono Bello is a leading provider of cosmetic surgery, offering operational clinics that provide various medical weight loss treatments, including laser liposuction, micro-laser liposuction, cellulite reduction procedures, and excess skin removal surgeries.
On or around October 2023, Plaintiff T.S. alleges that they booked an appointment on Sono Bello’s website for a consultation for a surgical weight loss procedure. She alleged that when she booked the appointment, Sono Bello transmitted her online activity to Facebook by using Meta – the Facebook Tracking Pixel. She alleged that Meta secretly duplicated and transcribed her communication with the website and transmitted that information and her identity to Facebook’s servers.
Sono Bello moved to dismiss the action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For a plaintiff to survive 12(b)(6) dismissal, the court reviews whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face[.]’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
The Western District of Washington assessed whether a claim for relief was plausible by viewing each clause of CIPA separately.
CIPA § 631(a) details “three distinct and mutually independent patterns of conduct: intentional wiretapping [under Clause One], willfully attempting to learn the contents or meaning of a communication in transit over a wire [under Clause Two], and attempting to use or communicate information obtained as a result of engaging in either of the previous two activities [under Clause Three],” Tavernetti v. Superior Ct., 583 P.2d 737, 741 (Cal. 1978). The statute additionally imposes liability on those who aid or abet others in engaging in these activities under Clause Four.
Sono Bello argued that T.S.’s claims failed because she premised her claim on Clause Four of the statute and did not allege a predicate violation of Clauses One, Two, or Three as Clause Four requires. Sono Bello provided additional arguments as to why T.S.’s claims would further fail in Clauses One, Two and Three, as discussed below.
Clause One
The parties disputed whether Clause One applies to newer technologies, such as Meta. In the absence of binding authority from the California Supreme Court, the Western District of Washington predicted how the California Supreme Court would rule if confronted with the issue.
After reviewing varying California courts’ opinions on whether the statute is to be interpreted broadly to protect consumers’ privacy, or to be interpreted according to its text, the Court concluded that CIPA §631(a) does not apply to the internet.
The Court emphasized that the California Legislature’s intent in drafting CIPA is highlighted by the fact that they have had opportunities to amend § 631(a) to take privacy issues raised by new technology into account, but have chosen not to, despite amending the law many times since it was enacted.
With that being said, the Court concluded that T.S. had not stated a claim for a violation of CIPA § 631(a) Clause One.
Clause Two
Sono Bello contended that T.S. failed to allege a predicate for Clause Two because she failed to show that any contents of communications were intercepted while in transit.
The Court rejected T.S.’s argument that she only needed to demonstrate a party intercepting communication during its transmission rather than once it was placed in electronic storage and determined that existing California case law required more than an allegation of interception and storing data.
Thus, the Court found that T.S. failed to allege that Meta had reviewed her communications while they were “in transit” and had not stated a violation of Clause Two.
Clause Three
Sono Bello also contended that T.S. had failed to allege a predicate violation of Clause 3 in failing to allege sufficient facts showing that Meta had used or attempted to use T.S.’s information.
For T.S. to have stated a claim under Clause Three, she must have sufficiently alleged a claim under Clause Two because a violation under Clause Three is contingent upon the finding of a violation of the first or second clause of CIPA § 631 (a). See Heiting v. Taro Pharms. USA, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 3d 1112, 1124–25 (C.D. Cal. 2024).
Therefore, T.S.’s claim also failed under Clause 3.
Ultimately, the Court granted Sono Bello’s motion to dismiss as to T.S.’s CMIA and CIPA claims, adding a further emphasis to the understanding that CIPA should be read according to its text.