Hi CIPAWorld! My name is Yara and I am one week old. Today we have a new Central District of California decision that provides additional guidance on what plaintiffs must actually allege to turn website tracking into a viable § 631(a) claim.
In Firlej v. Petrosian Esthetic Enters., LLC, No. 2:26-cv-01030-MWC-AGR, 2026 WL 2575938 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2026), Plaintiff Hania Rouhani alleged that tracking pixels and third-party cookies captured sensitive, personally identifiable information, including ‘Sensitive Health Information’ (“SHI”), and transmitted information to Google without her knowledge when she used SEV Laser Aesthetics’ website to schedule a laser appointment.
But this was not Rouhani’s first bite at the apple. Rouhani originally brought six causes of action against Defendants, including a claim under CIPA § 631(a). On June 18, 2026, the Court dismissed her CIPA claim with leave to amend. While the Court found that Rouhani plausibly alleged that the Tracking Tools transmitted the “contents” of her communications, she failed to adequately allege that Google actually “read” those communications while they were “in transit.” Id. at *2.
Rouhani returned with a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), adding allegations that Google “read,” “used,” and “monetized” her SHI for advertising services and “learned of the contents” of her communications. Defendants again moved to dismiss the CIPA claim, leaving the Court to decide: Did Rouhani allege enough this time? Id. at *2.
“Reading” Requirement
For purposes of § 631(a), reading or learning the contents of a communication requires “some effort at understanding the substantive meaning” of the communication. Id. at *3.
Rouhani added allegations that Google “read,” “analyzed,” and “learned” her information, but the Court ultimately regarded those as conclusory recitations of the CIPA requirement, rather than factual allegations showing how Google actually read the information.
The Court recognized that her receipt of targeted ads after using SEV’s website supported a reasonable inference that Google read or learned her SHI, but the allegations primarily described the collection and transmission of data. The Court emphasized that collection and transmission alone do not amount to reading or learning the data. The Court ultimately held that Rouhani needed additional factual allegations supporting the inference that Google specifically read, attempted to read, or learned the contents of her communications when using the information for advertising analytics. Id. at *4-5.
“In Transit” Requirement
But alleging that Google “read” the information was only half the battle. Section 631(a) also requires that the communication be read “in transit.” While a plaintiff does not have to precisely allege how and when the communications are captured at the pleading stage, the Court explained that a plaintiff must still provide fair notice of how and when she believes the defendant or third party intercepts her communications. Id. at *5.
Here, Rouhani alleged that the Pixels collected and transmitted online behavior “in real-time as the user navigates a website.” But “real-time” was not enough. The Court found that the FAC described a process of collection and transmission, rather than reading while the communication was in transit. Although the Pixels allegedly collected and transmitted data in real time, Rouhani did not allege that Google simultaneously read the communications, as required under CIPA. Id. at *5-6.
So, Rouhani’s second bite at the apple came up short. The Court dismissed her CIPA claim, finding that the FAC failed to plausibly allege both that Google read or learned the contents of her communications and that any such reading occurred while the communications were in transit. However, the Court granted Rouhani leave to amend once again, finding that greater factual detail and specificity as to how and when Google reads her SHI could cure the deficiencies. Id. at *6.
The takeaway from Firlej is that alleging that a tracking tool collects and transmits website data, even in “real-time” may not be enough to state a claim under § 631(a). Plaintiffs still need to connect the dots by plausibly alleging how a third party actually “reads” or learns the contents of a communication and when that reading occurs.