Hi, CIPAWorld! Kelly Sandberg here, with a new case on why it is crucial to understand the traditional harms alleged in our courts.
In Raquel Diaz et al v. Paramount Skydance Corporation et al., Plaintiff Raquel Diaz and others similarly situated (“Plaintiffs”) sued Paramount Skydance Corporation (“Paramount”) on behalf of their minor children for disclosing information about their online activity. Raquel Diaz et al v. Paramount Skydance Corporation et al., No. EDCV 25-02945-KK-DTBx, 2026 WL 1090958 (C.D. Ca. Apr. 20, 2026). To summarize, the United States District Court for the Central District of California granted Paramount’s motion to dismiss because Plaintiffs failed to closely align their theories of injury to those which American courts recognize as providing a basis for a lawsuit.
Paramount owns and operates a video streaming platform that requires users to register for a “Pluto TV” account through Paramount’s subsidiary, Pluto Inc. Paramount installed surveillance software like Google and Microsoft on their streaming platform to monitor the activity of website visitors. This website activity information can then be used by advertisers to curate individual advertising profiles and tailor advertisements to those website users. Paramount’s platform contains a “Children’s Privacy Policy” that provides they will not share personally identifiable information form minor users “without obtaining parental permission.
Between 2024 and 2025, Plaintiffs watched pre-recorded video content in the “Kids” section of Paramount’s streaming platform. They alleged that they were “typical internet users” who were “unable to detect” the surveillance software installed on the platform, and that Paramount had harvested personally identifiable information about their minor users and “simultaneously” shared that information with Google and Microsoft without their consent. They further alleged that this conduct was against Paramount’s “Children’s Privacy Policy” that provides they will not share personally identifiable information from minor users “without obtaining parental permission.”
Plaintiffs’ complaint contained eight causes of action against Paramount, including violations of the VPPA, ECPA, CIPA, invasion of privacy, violation of the right to privacy under the California Constitution, negligence, breach of implied contract, and unjust enrichment. Paramount subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the claims for lack of standing, application of a governing forum clause and the Plaintiffs failure to state a claim. As a result, the court dismissed all eight causes of action based on Plaintiffs’ lack of standing.
For a Plaintiff to establish standing under Article III of the Constitution, they must show “(1) injury in fact, (2) causation, and (3) redressability.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).
The court here focused on the Plaintiffs’ failure to show an injury in fact and relied on the requirement noted in TransUnion LLC, that the injury must be closely related “to a harm ‘traditionally’ recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts.” TransUnion LLC, 594 U.S. at 424 (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. at 341 (2016)).
Here, Plaintiffs raised three theories of injury: (1) a privacy injury resulting from Paramount’s provision of personally identifiable information to Google and Microsoft; (2) an intrusion upon seclusion injury resulting from the dissemination of the personally identifiable information; and (3) the loss of valuable rights and protections – including money – obtained by Paramount, Google and Microsoft from the collection of the personally identifiable information.
The court determined that none of these theories of injury were recognized bases for lawsuits in American courts.
The privacy injury was not analogous to the traditionally recognized harm of disclosure of private information because there existed no disclosure of “embarrassing, invasive, or otherwise private information.” Popa v. Microsoft Corp., 153 F.4th at 794 (9th Cir. 2025). The only information disclosed was Plaintiffs’ viewing activity, rather than Plaintiffs’ watch history.
The intrusion upon seclusion injury failed to establish how the intrusion of their information was “similar to the ‘highly offensive’ interferences or disclosures that were actionable at common law.” Popa, 153 F.4th at 791. The vague assertion of “personally identifiable information” in the form of “specific videos watched by minors” contained no sufficient basis to show an expectation of privacy. Further, even if this information contained more specific, sensitive information, Plaintiffs failed to show that the disclosure of the information was highly offensive.
The loss of valuable rights and protections injury failed because Plaintiffs could not show a diminution in value through an unjust enrichment claim. In such a claim, the enrichment is only “unjust” when a plaintiff has “conferred a benefit ‘through mistake, fraud, coercion, or request.’” Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 783 F.3d 753, 762 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting 55 Cal. Jur. 3d Restitution §2). Plaintiffs here held a mutually beneficial agreement with Paramount by signing up for the streaming platform, and this agreement negated the premise of their claim for unjust enrichment.
Overall, because each theory of injury alleged by Plaintiffs was not one recognized as a bases for lawsuits in American Courts, the court dismissed all eight counts of privacy violations.
The important message here is that knowing and applying the basic historical framework of an injury in fact remains to be an imperative element of all claims. You must know the harm to receive the reward!